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ABSTRACT 
Why did a majority of French voters reject the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 
the 2005 referendum? We argue here that the collective mobilization of the left-wing ‘No’ camp 
made the decisive difference through its formation of Collectifs pour le non, a coalition which 
facilitated the public expression of an anti-liberal and pro-European position capable of bringing 
together the Green and Socialist electorates, along with other parts of the left. Using a 
comprehensive analysis of the multi-organizational field of protest constituted by the 
mobilization of the left-wing No camp, we show first that the mobilization was a ‘European 
affair’, in the sense that it developed a pro-European position in the context of struggles against 
liberal forces. Second, we show that the mobilization was also a French affair because it relied on 
the high valuation of the national mode of belonging, through the defence of the French state 
model. 
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The Mobilization against the 2005 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A French 
Mobilization for Another Europe 
 
On 29 May 2005, French citizens were asked the following question: Approuvez-vous le projet de 
loi qui autorise la ratification du traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe?.i The No 
votes won with 54.68%; the Yes votes totalised 45.32%; the turnout rate was very high for a 
European consultation (69.7%) (Ministère de l’intérieur, 2006). It was the highest No vote in a 
referendum in French history; in 18 referendums of this type since universal suffrage was 
introduced, only two had previously produced a negative result (in 1946 and 1969) (Perrineau 
2005, p. 233). The 2005 vote prompted a major political crisis in the Europe-building process and 
led to an overhaul of the political landscape in France.  
 
Why, then, did a majority of French voters reject the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (henceforth the ‘Treaty’)? Some electoral analyses have directly linked the 'no' vote to the 
inward-looking nature of a large part of the electorate and to the fear produced by Europe 
building. Others maintained that French citizens voted no because of the French political context. 
In this paper, I challenge this structural argument in terms of its cleavages and qualify it in terms 
of ‘Frenchness’. I argue that, even if the No position was not a new one in the French context, 
something special happened in 2005: the collective mobilization of the left No camp, and argue 
that it is this mobilization which made the crucial difference. Compared to previous episodes of 
French voting on issues of European legislation, the mobilization enabled the public expression 
of an anti-liberal and thus pro-European position capable of bringing together part of the left 
electorate, especially the Green and the Socialist electorates. This radicalization of a portion of 
the French left electorate is linked to changes affecting progressive French social and political 
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forces over the last fifteen years. 
 
My argument is developed in two steps. First, I show that the mobilization of the left No camp 
was a European affair, in the sense that it developed a pro-European position in the context of 
struggles against liberal forces (section 3). Second, I show that the mobilization was also a 
French affair because it relied on a dominant position primarily valuing the national mode of 
belonging through the defence of the French state model (section 4). 
 
In order to demonstrate this I will use a comprehensive analysis of the multi-organizational field 
of protest composed by the left No camp mobilization. In other words, I will use analytical social 
movement tools to examine an episode of conventional politics: the referendum. By investigating 
this meso-level of analysis (the collective action), it is possible to go beyond individual electoral 
behaviour and offer an understanding of the social and political dynamics at work at the time of 
the referendum period, and which are still active today.  
 
I conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews in June 2005 in Paris and met leaders of 
various organizations directly involved in the left 'No' coalition. A comprehensive list of 
interviews is included in the bibliography. The main topic of the interviews was globalization and 
the actors’ attitudes towards it, but a few minutes after the beginning of the interview, most 
people spontaneously spoke of the Europe-building process and the victory of the 'No' side on 29 
May. This data was supplemented by written material (campaign material, and web sites, 
consulted in May 2005, and propaganda material), and a systematic consultation of newspapers 
(Le Monde, Libération and Le Figaro) during the referendum period (January to June 2005). 
Before presenting the results of this research, I will return to the main analysis of the No vote in 
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France in order to situate the research (section 1) and thus present the context of the coalition and 
its emergence (section 2). 
 
I Return to the ‘No’ Vote 
Shortly after the referendum, various electoral analyses attempted to draw conclusions from the 
results, which were described as ‘surprising’, by dissecting voter preference and proposing a 
sociological analysis of the outcome. 
 
According to analyses produced by the IPSOS polling institute, the result was essentially a 
victory for the left, which made up two-thirds of the overall No vote, whilst the extreme-right 
accounted for the remaining third of the No vote. Nevertheless, on the left of the political 
spectrum the parties were highly divided. Almost sixty per cent of the Socialist and Green 
electorates voted against the Treaty whilst the parties themselves backed a Yes vote. On the right, 
the situation was markedly different, as 80% of the Gaullist UMP (Union pour la majorité 
présidentielle) electorate voted in favour of the Treaty, in line with their party's line on the issue. 
As for unions, 74 % of the Communist-aligned Confédération générale du travail (CGT) 
members voted No, along with 65% of the leftist Union syndicale Solidaires (USS, a federation 
of 39 unions outside the European Trade Union Confederation), yet only 46 % of the more 
centrist Confédération française démocratique du Travail (CFDT) members rejected the Treaty 
(IPSOS, website, 2005). 
 
In the same analysis, it appears that No voters were voting against the decline in the quality of 
living conditions (52%) and the excessive liberalism included in the Constitution project (40%). 
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The Yes camp, in contrast, backed the ambition of creating a Europe able to measure itself 
favourably against China and the United States (64%) and to prevent No voters from stopping or 
slowing down the European construction process (44%) (IPSOS, website, 2005). Sociological 
differences were also highly germane: the more affluent and educated voters voted in favour of 
the Treaty while those with less formal education were more likely to vote No. Finally, young 
people voted more in this referendum than for the Maastricht Treaty, and they returned a large 
majority No vote. 
 
The electoral analyses of these results have developed in two directions. One interprets the vote 
mainly as a ‘French affair’; the other position argues that explanation through the French political 
context is not the whole story.  
 
To make sense of this ‘surprising result’, Pascal Perrineau has spoken of the ‘nationalisation of 
the European vote’, showing that the debates were mostly framed in relation to national issues 
(the unpopularity of the government, economic and social pessimism, fear of ‘strangers’) 
(Perrineau 2005, p. 229). He also linked these reactions to the way debates over Europe-building 
were traditionally organized in France, with ‘Euro-sceptics’ on one side and ‘pro-Europeans’ on 
the other. The ‘pro-Europeans’ constitute the open part of the electorate, primarily urban, highly 
educated, open-minded and in favour of multiculturalism and European integration; the ‘Euro-
sceptics’ constitute the closed part of the electorate, more closed-minded, mostly rural, less 
educated, against European integration, ethnocentric (Chiche et al., 2000; Perrineau, 2005: 238). 
For Perrineau, the reinforcement of the No camp after the 1992 Maastricht referendum did not 
change the fundamental structure of the opposition between Yes and No to Europe. In 2005, as 
before, the right/left cleavage imploded in the face of the European integration issue, opposing 
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the No camp (with extreme-left and extreme-right forces) and the Yes camp (the centre-right and 
the centre-left). It is also important to note that the same types of electorate supported the No side 
in 1957 (the Rome Treaty), in 1972 (the first EU enlargement), in 1992 (Maastricht) and in 2005, 
at least for three-quarters of the No voters (Perrineau, 2005: 240).  
 
Others analysts have suggested a slightly different and more nuanced interpretation of the 
structure of the vote in 2005, by focusing on the quarter of the electorate who voted Yes in 1992 
and No in 2005, and who, according to their analyses, make up the ‘deciding’ portion of the 
voting population. These voters, traditionally in favour of European integration, chose to follow 
their dissenting leaders and not their organizations in 2005 – a phenomenon that can certainly be 
recognised as the case for the Green and the Socialist electorates. 
 
For example, Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, using multivariate analysis, show that the 
political distrust hypothesis (rejection of political elites or the government) lacks persuasiveness 
(Brouard & Tiberj 2006, p. 266). They propose a comparison of the similarities and differences 
between the 1992 Maastricht referendum, which was accepted by only 51% of French voters, and 
the 2005 referendum. They show that in 2005, as in 1992, all social groups were represented in 
the vote against the Treaty and ‘the higher the class level of the individual’s profession, the 
higher the probability that they [would] support the European Treaties’ (Brouard & Tiberj 2006, 
p. 262). But, in 2005, less of the middle-class were in favour of the Treaty than were in favour of 
Maastricht, so the social basis of the Yes vote diminished during the same period of time. 
 
As in 1992, in 2005 the extreme right and the extreme left remained in the No camp. Since 
Maastricht however, the positions of the mainstream parties have changed. In 1992, under the 
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presidency of François Mitterrand, the Socialist Party (PS) supported the then President and 
campaigned for the Yes side, persuading the majority of Socialist supporters to vote for the 
Treaty (Bussi, Colange & Gosset 2005, p. 9). But in 2005, Jacques Chirac was President and 
campaigning for the Yes vote, while the PS was more divided, and the majority of Socialist 
voters voted No, a pattern also found within Les Verts (the Greens). From this perspective, the 
results of the 2005 referendum are not only a question of putative ‘French’ political fears of 
Europe as expressed by extreme left and right electorates, but also mark a change in the way parts 
of the middle-class, educated and left electorate evaluates the achievements of European 
governance. Compared to previous debates (Nice in 2001 or Maastricht in 1992), the No camp 
was characterized not only by rejection of, but also by disappointment over European integration. 
As Ivaldi (2006) and Cambadélis et al. (2005) have argued, this disappointment over concrete 
European achievements has favoured the development of the classical left/right debate, 
questioning not European construction per se but rather the structure of the Europe that is being 
built. 
 
In this respect, the 2005 referendum is not a repetition of structural French anti-European 
positions. It is over-simplistic to talk about a 'French' reaction to a complex national political 
context, just as it is over-simplistic to put the results of the referendum down to French voting 
habits on European questions. I argue that what made the difference was the mobilization against 
the Treaty, which developed a pro-European and anti-liberal position, and opened the possibility 
for part of the mainstream left electorate to vote No without being necessarily anti-European. The 
next section presents the Collectif pour le non, the coalition that supported the mobilization 
against the Treaty.  
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II Beyond Established Borders: A Multiorganizational Protest Field in a Constrained 
Context 
Social movement analyses have traditionally divided politics into two spheres: conventional 
versus unconventional politics, partisan versus protest politics, the field of social movements 
versus the field of partisan politics (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Mathieu, 2002, 2007). Beyond the 
theoretical differences inherent in these terms, the premise underlying this binary classification is 
that certain types of organizations favour specific types of collective actions. For instance, 
political parties are generally concerned with conventional politics in the electoral arena, while 
social movement organizations specialize in protest politics. Most of the contemporary literature 
recognizes the often artificial nature of these partitions and the increasing complexity of the 
political game, which no longer corresponds to a strict division of tasks. The mobilization against 
the Treaty offers an excellent illustration of these dynamics. For instance, the mobilization clearly 
took place in the field of conventional politics, given that a referendum was held and that social 
and political actors came together with the objective of ‘winning’ the referendum. In addition, the 
organizational diversity of the coalition was remarkable, including political parties from the left 
and extreme-left, ecological parties, union leaders and volunteer and non-profit organizations. 
The main characteristic of this coalition was that it blurred the boundaries between the 
traditionally distinct spheres of collective action (see Table 1).  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
The mobilization against the Treaty, the Collectif pour le non, brought together political parties 
from the left of the political spectrum (a fraction of the PS, a fraction of Les Verts, the Parti 
communiste (PCF), the trotskyist Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (LCR)), unions 
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(Confédération paysanne, USS, CGT, a number of local education unions) and various social 
actors (Association pour la taxation des transactions pour l’Aide aux citoyens (ATTAC), the 
Centre d’études et d’initiatives de solidarités internationals (CEDETIM) and the Copernic 
Foundation, a progressive think tank). 
 
In order to account for this type of coalition, recent social movement literature (Klandermans, 
1992; Fillieule & Blanchard, 2005) has reintroduced the notion of ‘multiorganizational fields’ 
developed by Curtis and Zurcher (1973). A multiorganizational field refers to a network of 
alliances consisting of the various organizations rallied around a cause. It is analysed at the 
activist level (many are active across several different scenes) as well as at the organizational 
level (revealing the various connections uniting them or placing them in a situation of conflict). 
Fillieule and Blanchard (2005) have mapped out the French alterglobalist ‘multiorganizational 
field’ that existed at the time of the 2003 European Social Forum in Paris/Saint-Denis, 
demonstrating how the alterglobalist movement corresponds more to an incongruous movement 
of collective actors who are assembled at certain poles and who share activist profiles and causes. 
This concept allows the space of the mobilizations to be considered in a dynamic fashion, by 
situating the collective actors in a field of alliances and of conflicts that is not limited a priori by 
the nature of the organizations or the location of the mobilization and that is extremely sensitive 
to the context of the action.  
 
If this concept seems particularly appropriate to study the Collectif pour le non, the specific 
context in which this multiorganizational field emerged needs some clarification due to its direct 
impact on the possible dynamics among actors involved. 
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First, the multiorganizational field formed by the mobilization against the Treaty was formed 
within a relatively set structure of alliances and opposition. In fact, the referendum context 
quickly led to the formation of two sides (the Yes side and the No side), giving rise to a strong 
polarization of the debate. This specific structure imposed tight constraints on the kind of 
discourses that could be developed, and a large portion of the energy deployed during the 
campaign by actors was directed towards rebuilding boundaries within the two camps (the left-
wing actors in the Yes camp (PS, Les Verts, CFDT) working very hard to distance themselves 
from the right-wing actors in their camp (UMP); and in the No camp, the left-wing forces (PS, 
PC, Les Verts, LCR, ATTAC, USS, CGT) similarly working very hard to separate themselves 
from the extreme-right Front national (FN)). As a result, a consideration of the changing 
dynamics between actors is less relevant, due to its stability in this context. Nevertheless, this 
stability was not a ‘given’, as it had been constructed by all of the collective actors involved. To 
explain how such a multiorganizational field could have emerged, we first have to look at the 
political context in which the referendum took place. 
 
The campaign took place in a relatively tense national context. The government was clearly 
losing ground, but it nevertheless refused to give in to the demands of societal actors. The 
political left was still divided, despite the positive outcome of the regional elections in 2004, in 
which the unified left had won control of 20 of France’s 22 regional councils. It was as if the 
2002 presidential election – in which Lionel Jospin, the former Prime minister and Socialist 
candidate, was eliminated in the first round, with Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen 
progressing to the second round run-off with Jacques Chirac – remained a traumatic event for the 
left political forces. Moreover, societal actors had experienced several recent defeats, particularly 
over Prime minister Raffarin’s pension reform plan, which had been adopted despite the huge 
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mobilizations against it in May 2003.ii  
 
The referendum period was a fabulous opportunity for left leaders to build political capital and to 
position themselves for the next presidential elections in 2007. This was certainly the case for the 
PS and its leader (Francois Hollande), who led the party’s Yes position. It was also the case for 
the LCR and Laurent Fabius, one of the main PS dissidents and the party’s second-in-command, 
and it was definitely the case for ATTAC. As Agrikoliansky has demonstrated (Agrikoliansky, 
2007), the referendum campaign came at the right time for ATTAC: the organization was 
experiencing serious internal turmoil and stood to benefit from the referendum context. It would 
have an opportunity to rally its troops and reclaim its place within the French alterglobalist 
nebula by demonstrating its strength and mobilization capacity in the course of the campaign. 
 
The competition among these leaders (and others, such as peasant syndicalist José Bové) after the 
referendum, in anticipation of the 2007 presidential election, and the difficulties they faced in 
unifying the left-wing forces, clearly point to the interpretation of the referendum period as an 
‘exceptional’ period, led by the strategic calculations of each leader. Nevertheless, ending the 
analysis here would be to truncate the discussion.  
 
Why did thousands of activists, affiliated or not to the main organizations which were included in 
the coalition, participate in meetings, organise public debates in small villages, public markets, 
and also peoples’ kitchens? As Crettiez and Sommier indicate, 200,000 people were part of the 
Collectif in May 2005, participating in 1000 local Collectifs; 1500 public meetings were held 
between October 2004 and March 2005 and 60,000 posters distributed (Crettiez & Sommier, 
2006: 204-205).  
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In these episodes of massive mobilization, ideas have played a key role in the mobilization 
process. People on the ground were not only acting because it was a good strategic choice for 
their organization, but also because they believed their positions were the best for the future of 
Europe, France, and themselves. To go beyond leaders' strategies and explanations, and to 
understand how collective actors managed to build these common positions, I propose to analyse 
the content of the mobilization, in general and for each actor.  
 
In its original formulation, the multiorganizational field concept assumed the cognitive dimension 
as a given, whereby the organizations belonging to the same coalition were deemed to share the 
same ideologies (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973). In a 1997 study, Evans elaborates on Klandermans’ 
proposal that the structure of the field of alliances impacts upon the building of meaning within 
the coalition. He suggests that certain structural factors affecting the selection of cognitive 
frameworks of collective action be updated (Evans, 1997). More specifically, he attempts to 
measure the impact on the building of multiple target frameworks (members, sympathizers, 
allies, opponents) for a given coalition of actors. In common with Evans, we think that the 
content of mobilizations in the multiorganizational field are the complex result of the 
relationships between contextual elements, the type of coalitions built, and the strategies of 
actors. However, we propose a more constructivist view of ‘frame building’ than the literature on 
framing has generally assumed (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
 
More specifically, we propose to relate the context of the mobilization against the Treaty (the 
very specific period of the referendum campaign) to the short-term history of protest in France. In 
the next section, we show how the mobilization against the Treaty was portrayed by the actors 
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involved as a mobilization for ‘another Europe’, directly linking the emergence of the coalition to 
the multiorganizational field of protest for ‘another world’ that emerged during the 1990s in 
France. In the final section, we take into account the content-based differences within the 
coalition, to show that this multiorganizational field is also directly linked with French political 
debates on the left of the political spectrum. If the Collectif pour le non offered a pro-European 
and anti-liberal opposition on the Treaty, it was also articulating a position that primarily valued 
an idea of French 'belonging' through the defence of the French state model, a position which is 
not shared by all alterglobalist activists.  
 
III The Mobilization Against the Treaty: A ‘European Affair’  
The leaders interviewed employed strong language to describe the result of the referendum: ‘May 
1968 in the ballot box’ (P. Farbiaz, 2005, personal communication); ‘A national political 
earthquake’ (A. Krivine, 2005, personal communication); ‘A historical victory against 
neoliberalism’ (J. Nikonoff, 2005, personal communication; all translations are the author’s). In 
addition to the drama of the situation (the interviews were conducted a few days after the victory 
of the No side), the reactions of the actors we met conveyed the deep political significance of the 
referendum campaign. How did this mobilization fit with the short-term history of protest in 
France? In this section, we show that the Collectif pour le non was directly linked with the 
emergence of an alterglobalist nebula in France. This direct affiliation has favoured the 
dominance of a discourse for ‘another Europe’.  
 
A Multiorganizational Field linked with past mobilizations for ‘another world’ 
The mobilization against the Treaty began with the Appel contre le traité constitutionnel 
européen [Call to oppose the European Constitutional Treaty], which was launched by the 
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Copernic Foundation, signed by 200 people, and published in the communist newspaper 
L’Humanité on 20 October 2004. Over 500 signatures were rapidly obtained, and the Appel des 
200, an informal group of organizations and individuals, was created. In April 2005, it was active 
under the name Collectif national pour un non de gauche. After the referendum, it became the 
Collectif national du 29 mai and pursued its activities for ‘another Europe’ (see 
www.collectifdu29mai.org).iii 
 
As several studies have shown, since the early 1990s, France has experienced a rise in protest 
activity (AIDS advocacy, protests by the unemployed, the homeless, undocumented immigrants, 
the general strike of November and December 1995, and so on), while left political parties have 
been distancing themselves from social actors and their claims (Mathieu, 2002, 2007; Andretta & 
Reiter, 2007). As Mathieu explains (2007: 143), it was during the 1997 legislative elections that 
Act Up launched the ‘We are the Left’ call that directly pitted social movement organizations 
against political parties. This wariness toward actors from the political partisan field would 
continue to grow at a time when the ‘plural left’ coalition of the PS, PCF and Les Verts, was in 
power (from 1997 to 2001). Today, it is a characteristic of organizations that are active in the 
global justice movement, in France and elsewhere (della Porta et al., 2006; Agrikoliansky and 
Sommier, 2005). In this context, the creation of a Collectif national pour le non au Traité 
appeared as a break with routine protest practices.  
 
At the same time, the existence of the Collectif was not the result of a spontaneous generation of 
activists. Quite the contrary, in fact. It is linked with more than ten years of different struggles. 
As della Porta and Caiani (2007: 2) have stated, the left No in France was largely sustained by 
actors who participated in the movement for a ‘Europeanization from below,’ which gradually 
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emerged from the mid-1990s. These same actors and resource networks were mobilized during 
the preparation of the European Social Forum of 2003 in Paris/Saint-Denis and during the 2005 
referendum campaign (Agrikoliansky, 2007: 224). These networks, in the case of France, made 
extensive use of resources offered by extreme-left political organizations such as the PCF 
(Andretta and Reiter, 2007: 234) as well as the LCR (A. Krivine, 2005, personal communication) 
and by union organizations (the SUD unions and the Confédération paysanne in particular). From 
this perspective, the nature of the coalition does not appear to be a departure from France’s very 
recent history of protest movements. Rather, it was simply making public the activist practices 
with which social movement activists and analysts were very familiar. This structural connection 
also provides an understanding of why the argument of the Collectif in favour of ‘another 
Europe’ draws directly on arguments ‘for another world’ common in alterglobalist circles. 
 
What is more striking in the 2005 coalition is the presence of leaders of non-extreme left parties, 
such as the Greens and the Socialist Party. How could these links have been possible? The 
French Socialists had supported all previous European Treaties, with the exception of the 
European Defence Community in 1954. In 2005, the party was strongly divided, and some 
leaders, such as Fabius, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and Henri Emmanuelli,iv publicly supported the No 
side. In December 2004, the PS organized an internal referendum on the Treaty (Treille, 2007): 
58% of the members who voted were in favour of it. Despite these results, the No leaders of the 
PS continued to campaign against the Treaty, and Fabius was an active organizer of the No side 
during the campaign (for further details concerning internal divisions, see Ivaldi 2006). 
 
The Greens were also shaken by the debates concerning the Treaty. Since the mid-1990s, they 
had been very close to an alterglobalist position.v In 2003, they created an alterglobalist section 
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within the party, distinct from International Relations, for the purpose of the European Social 
Forum in Paris/Saint-Denis in 2003. Although the party officially endorsed the Yes camp, a large 
number of Green activists voted No and supported the No campaign. As Patrick Farbiaz, in 
charge of the alterglobalist section, has stated:  
 
It is our political identity that is at stake because Greens are naturally part of the global 
justice movement [...] By campaigning for the ‘Yes’ side we are giving the impression 
that we are the same as the socio-liberals of the Parti socialiste [...] It is going to be very 
difficult to put a ‘Band-Aid’ over it. (P. Farbiaz, 2005, personal communication, author’s 
translation).  
 
Social movement literature has extensively documented the phenomenon of the multipositionality 
of activists within left-wing organizations (Andretta & Reiter, 2007: 238). In France, this 
phenomenon has been at work since the mid-1990s and the emergence of ATTAC, the leader of 
the emerging alterglobalist protest network (Crettiez & Sommier, 2006: 488). Often,  ATTAC 
activists are also activists for the PS or Greens. Multi-positionality means that borders between 
conventional and unconventional actions are more and more porous for individuals. It is precisely 
in this context that some convergences among radical left and left partisan organizations have 
developed. The possibility of the No coalition is thus also the result of this larger transformation, 
which has its own roots in the radicalization of some leftist activists (the massive mobilizations 
of December 1995 are one of the turning points generally raised in the literature – see for 
example Mathieu, 2009) and the realignment process that followed within left-wing political 
parties (Ivaldi, 2006).  
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The renewal of dynamics among social and political actors has opened up the possibility for a 
multiorganizational field, such as the No coalition, to emerge. But what about the content of it? 
The discursive framework that sustained it was broad (and vague) enough to accommodate all of 
them: the common desire for ‘another Europe’. 
 
A Coalition for ‘Another Europe’ 
Beyond the ideological differences which distinguish the collective actors involved in the 
coalition, two complementary elements form the basis for their opposition to the Treaty.  
 
First, the liberal nature of the Treaty (Article I-3) was criticized for two main reasons: its 
constitutionalization of the neo-liberal Europe-building process, and its closure of the door to 
alternative policy options. In this respect, mobilization against the Treaty was framed as a way to 
preserve the very possibility of building an alternative Europe. 
 
In the No camp within the PS, the Treaty was viewed as an attempt to cement not only the rules 
of the European (liberal) game, but its very nature as well, which would prevent the social 
European model from becoming a reality; Laurent Fabius, for example, claimed that a No could 
mean a new beginning for Europe, and that it was the duty of left forces to say No today to save 
the future of Europe (Fabius, 2004). In contrast, the dominant discourse within the PS presented 
the No camp as a No to Europe, while the Yes position was a guarantee that Europe-building 
would remain the primary tool with which to respond to economic globalization, along with 
financial taxation, fair trade, sustainable development and the reform of the WTO. As Lionel 
Jospin, campaigning for a Yes vote, stated in Nantes on 20 May 2005: ‘If the French vote No, 
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there will be no change in France. It will be a No to Europe’ (quoted in L’Hebdo des socialistes, 
28 May 2005, p.11, author’s translation). This position is consistent with PS discourses on 
Europe-building in general, which articulate the deepening of Europe-building as synonymous 
with having more tools to regulate capitalism (Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002). By saying No to the 
Treaty, PS dissidents had to prove that they were not anti-European and also that it was necessary 
to exit (and break) the liberal path in order to build a true European social-democratic path.  
 
The PCF and the LCR opposed what they argued to be the liberal project of the Treaty, and 
framed their opposition within the larger struggle against liberalism. For them, the Treaty would 
reinforce Europe as an economic partner of the USA, rather than as a potential counter-weight to 
its global geo-political hegemony. The 29 May victory was interpreted as only a step in the fight 
against liberalism and its policies, not as an end in itself (Duval, 2005: 5); post- referendum, the 
struggle to build progressive alternatives on a European scale would continue. 
 
Second, all the left-wing No forces claimed that through their opposition they were ensuring the 
possibility of building another Europe in the future, together and from below, i.e., democratically. 
This argument about ‘democracy’ was especially used by the LCR and the USS. The LCR 
stressed the need to oppose the ‘undemocratic’ process of the Treaty, and pushed for the 
democratization of European institutions, and more participatory democracy. They also proposed 
the creation of constituent assemblies for Europe and the adoption of a new charter of rights. 
They justified their strategies by arguing that after the rejection of the Treaty, the constitutional 
project would have to be redefined and renegotiated with a stronger voice for the left No camp. 
For the USS, a No victory had the potential to realign the European political process, and create 
positive opportunities for progressive forces to push for ‘another Europe’. 
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Members of the No coalition argued that the Treaty should be rejected as a liberal political 
project in the name of the very possibility of ‘another Europe’. In this respect, the referendum 
period also corresponded to a key moment of alterglobalist mobilization in France. Dissident 
actors from institutionalised left forces (the PS, and to some extent the Greens) campaigned 
alongside what we might call, following Andretta and Reiter’s definition (2007: 226), as ‘radical-
left’ forces (if we exclude the PCF). Their participation in the No coalition was a reflection of 
profound divergences within these organizations, and symptomatic of changes at work on the left 
of the political spectrum since the mid-1990s. 
 
As Agrikoliansky (2007: 210) has stressed, the alterglobalist nebula was deeply divided on the 
Treaty issue. Certainly not all elements of the alterglobalist ‘movement’ campaigned for a No: for 
example, a number of leading figures, such as Antonio Negri, supported the Treaty. If, as we 
have demonstrated, the coalition against the Treaty was clearly inspired by discourses for 
‘another Europe’ and was a direct descendant of the fight against neo-liberal globalization, it still 
does not, however, represent the entire alterglobalist nebula. Moreover, the presence of a 
common framework of mobilization does not exclude the existence of major differences of 
opinion within the coalition. The multiorganizational field created by the Collectif pour le non 
was in fact criss-crossed by several lines of conflict. In the last part of the article, we return to this 
French side of the coalition; i.e. divisions that are proper to French leftist activists. We argue that 
territory was the major point of contention among actors and that the dominant position that 
prevailed prevents long-term convergence with other social forces, in France and in Europe. 
 
IV A French Mobilization 
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The Coalition for the No was not only a European affair, it was also a French mobilization. First, 
this is because at least part of the opposition from the left-wing No forces reflected a tactical 
opposition to President Chirac (this is especially true for the PCF and the LCR) (Ivaldi 2006; 
Perrineau, 2005). But more than a reaction to the French political context, the very content of the 
mobilization was divided around the crucial question of territorial identity. The territory issue 
was problematic from the perspective of European integration, as well as from that of economic 
globalization. What were the boundaries of belonging? What were the targets of claims? For 
whom were organizations fighting: European citizens or French ones? What was the main 
referent of discourse, the national territory or European solidarity networks? 
  
Divergent relationships vis-à-vis territory 
For historical reasons, the nation-state in Europe has built territorial links through its social 
policies and the regulation of social solidarity. If the national social state is no longer a guarantee 
of social solidarity, what happens to the feeling of belonging? Can it simply be transposed to 
Europe and European institutions? Two contrasting positions on this matter have been developed. 
 
One position within the coalition considered the territory of belonging and the issues raised by 
the Treaty as primarily European. For these actors, such as the Confédération paysanne and the 
USS, as well as the dissident sections of the PS and Les Verts, the Brussels and European 
institutions were becoming central actors of solidarity between European citizens, including 
French citizens. They believed that increased European integration should go hand in hand with 
increased redistribution and solidarity on the European scale. The social model they were 
advocating was associated with (and for some, indistinguishable from) the European territory.  
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For traditional social democratic parties, the Europe-building process has always been a way of 
building a new social model in the context of globalization. For the PS, European integration was 
the only manner in which European societies could domesticate economic globalization and 
ensure the preservation of the social model for which they had been fighting for several decades, 
and which was no longer viable at the national level. The idea involved transposing this social 
model and regulating the economic forces that accompanied it to the level of European 
institutions, in the hope that these would be in a better position to control the economic systems 
than the national states, which had become powerless, would be. However, the dissident Socialist 
and Green forces felt that the Treaty did not allow European institutions to assume this role, and 
that some of the Treaty provisions had the potential to prevent, or at least drastically hinder, the 
development of a ‘social’ Europe. For these actors, it was therefore from the perspective of 
European belonging, and based on their partisan organization’s loyalty to the initial European 
project, that they chose the path of dissidence. 
 
For the unions, which had been more involved in the European Social Forum than the parties, 
beyond this interpretation of European integration as the primary tool for promoting and building 
‘a better Europe’, European construction was associated with the fight against another territorial 
enemy: the United States. In common with the global justice movement in general, these actors 
conceived the USA as emblematic of a model of economic development that must be rejected. 
Europe-building, as a territory and a social model, could become a way of opposing US 
hegemony. In this perspective, the opposition to the Treaty was grounded in a certain vision of 
Europe as the main alternative available to European citizens for building ‘another world’. For 
these actors, the borders of solidarity were increasingly European and, correspondingly, 
decreasingly national.  
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The second, dominant position in the multiorganizational field cast defence of the national 
territory as the primordial factor, with the connection to a European territory being possible only 
via national borders. This position was mainly promoted by ATTAC.vi As Ancelovici (2002, 
2004) has demonstrated, ATTAC emerged articulating ‘global claims that centred exclusively on 
globalization’, such as the Tobin tax on international movements of capital, the reform of tax 
havens, and the establishment of an international penal court; gradually, ‘ATTAC’s claims 
focused on more traditional and national themes, such as defending public services’ (Ancelovici, 
2004:54, author’s translation). The refocusing of ATTAC–France on national territorial concerns 
and the defence of the ‘French model’ would lead to internal divisions within the organizations, 
between those who joined the association on the basis of its initial global claims (activists as well 
as certain local ATTAC groups) and those who no longer saw a clear distinction between 
ATTAC and classic French left-wing organizations traditionally fighting for the defence of the 
state. This transformation would progressively pit anti-liberals (for whom ATTAC had become 
the standard-bearer) against the others, accused of being ‘social liberals,’ in other words, those 
open to redefining the left outside the state tradition (Ancelovici, 2004: 58). 
 
The referendum period was a pivotal time during which opposition between ‘sovereignists’ and 
‘federalists’ would crystallize, revealing, as Agrikoliansky points out (2007: 224), diverging 
positions concerning Europe that had not been brought to the forefront within the alterglobalist 
movement until then, despite their underlying continuous presence. As a result, the referendum 
period forced these organizations, with ATTAC at the helm, to position themselves with regard to 
the territorial stakes of the proposed alternative. ATTAC’s presence within the coalition, which at 
the outset was viewed as entirely new, thus heightened the debate between the ‘social liberals’ 
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and the ’anti-liberals’. Having become the think tank of the anti-liberals, ATTAC assumed the 
role of ‘intellectual avant-garde’ during the referendum period, blurring the nature of coalition’s 
relationship to Europe and preventing a complete separation of social issues (against the Treaty, 
for a defence of Social Europe on the European territory) and national issues (against the Treaty, 
for the defence of the French state model and for the export of this model to other peoples of 
Europe, which was the dominant position defended by ATTAC–France during the referendum 
period). This manner of framing the debate concerning the Treaty – and concerning Europe-
building in general – constitutes one of the French particularities of the debate.vii  
 
ATTAC carried out the concrete work of the mobilization, and expended much energy and 
resources meeting people on the ground and participating in thousands of meetings in local areas. 
In addition, at the national level, ATTAC produced an impressive amount of literature, which 
dissected and analysed the Treaty provisions. These jargon-free documents armed the coalition’s 
activists with arguments in support of their position. In addition, they also served as popular 
education tools, which were widely used and disseminated among members of the public. As 
Sarah Waters (2004) notes, the role of intellectuals within the organization was central, which 
explains why ATTAC’s political positions were extremely well developed and articulated, and 
why they had real influence within political, university, and media circles. Despite internal and 
external criticism of the centralization of power within the organization, ATTAC was the main 
source of knowledge and expertise for the left No camp.  
 
For ATTAC, the most important task in the campaign was to stop the Treaty. However, it was 
also an opportunity to disseminate popular education tools about anti-liberalism on the basis of 
the proposals the organization had developed during the campaign. This central role in the 
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coalition, as the main source of expertise, facilitated the diffusion of ATTAC’s positions in the 
No coalition’s multiorganizational field. But this specific French positioning hindered the 
development of longer-term convergences among left social and political actors, as we shall 
discuss below. 
 
Deepening divisions amongst French left-wing actors 
With the exception of certain Trotskyist activists, most of the activists involved in the 
alterglobalist mobilizations agreed that the French ‘progressive forces’ should operate in an era 
where revolutions are not part of the possible repertoire of actions. However, they disagree upon 
the most effective manner for carrying out the resistance. Some prefer to work towards the 
convergence of forces behind an anti-liberal avant-garde, others think that it is preferable to 
create empirical alternatives here and now, to demonstrate that it is possible to build ‘another 
world’. This debate is not unique to France. It divides alterglobalist movements around the world 
and represents a recurring cleavage within World Social Forums (De Sousa Santos, 2008). 
However, in the French context, it takes on particular significance because it has been coupled 
with differences regarding the collective actors’ preferred mode of belonging. 
 
The dominant position within ATTAC has been to build the social movement capable of 
‘jamming the machine’ (opposition to the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, the Treaty). 
For ATTAC, the objective of collective action against globalization is the fight against economic 
liberalism. This is a very classic strategy in left-wing protest strategies: to undermine the system 
so that it crumbles. This alignment has not always been obstacle-free (Agrikoliansky, 2007). 
Some leading activists inside ATTAC-France and some local ATTACs were also pushing for the 
necessity to engage in ‘another way of doing politics’, meaning that they were less concerned 
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with the outcomes of struggles and much more with their processes. In this respect, questions of 
participation, horizontal democracy, valuing diversity have become more important than 
questions of strategy. This dichotomy inside ATTAC enabled the building of coalitions with 
extreme-left partisan organizations tending towards political solutions to resistance (PCF, LCR) 
as well as with actors that supported the concept of ‘a fight for a fight’ (such as associations of 
the unemployed) or actors that fell somewhere in between (USS, Confédération paysanne). The 
presence of this double position inside ATTAC allows the organizations to build large networks 
of allies. The 2005 Coalition for the No is thus, in part, the successful result of this ambiguity. At 
the same time, the moment of the referendum changed the balance of power inside ATTAC and 
limited the nature of the alliances possible in the future. 
 
Between the birth of ATTAC in 1998 and 2005, the two positions coexisted, more or less 
pacifically. In 2005, during the referendum period, divergences concerning the most effective 
strategies raised, opposing those who wanted to build a coalition able to stop the Treaty (and who 
won the referendum) with those who wanted to continue the work towards the convergence of 
resistance across Europe. This strategic dispute combined with the divergences discussed above, 
regarding the content of the struggle (the fight for the French model for Europe OR for another 
Europe). The result was the emergence of two positions: on one side were the actors defending 
the French model, preferring a non-partisan political strategy that unified anti-liberal forces, and 
which concerns the positions of a large portion of the actors involved in the coalition against the 
Treaty. On the other side were those who supported the building of social networks beyond 
national borders and the articulation of fights on different scales and different territories as the 
primary means for converging fights and global resistance. These actors were not directly 
involved in the coalition. It includes the movement of the sans, or have-nots (undocumented 
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persons, the unemployed, the homeless), as well as more moderate organizations, including some 
international solidarity associations or women’s movements (e.g., the French chapter of the 
World March of Women). For a while, after the No victory, it was difficult for them to make 
themselves heard, with ATTAC and other members of the coalition having retained a monopoly 
over the opposition to neo-liberal globalization. In this sense, the 2005 campaign constituted a 
turning point in the balance of forces among alterglobalist activists.  
 
The 2005 referendum moment was also a turning point for all France’s left-wing parties. The 
Socialists and the Greens did not recover from their internal divisions over the Treaty and were 
unable to restore their lost unity. After the Collectif pour le non experience and success in 2005, 
some actors involved tried to build an electoral alliance to present a united candidate for the 2007 
presidential elections. This attempt was unsuccessful, and five candidates to the left of the PS ran 
in 2007, obtaining only 9% of the vote between them. Since then, the LCR has tried to federate 
the extreme-left, establishing the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste in February 2009. 
 
All in all, and ironically, the 2005 coalition for the No has produced more divisions among left-
wing social and political actors rather than a stable structuration of alliances. The main elements 
of divisions inside this multiorganizational field were and are typically French. For the majority 
of the actors involved, the best way of building another Europe was to defend and to promote the 
French State model. At the same time, this position – which was not dominant in the 
alterglobalist field before 2005 but became so during and after the referendum – represents a 
serious limitation of the possibility of enlarging the coalition (in France and in Europe), as well 
as to sustain it. 
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CONCLUSION  
The 2005 referendum result was essentially a victory of the left faction of the No camp. The 
mobilization of the coalition for the No certainly made the difference, opening a new space for 
part of the left electorate to be simultaneously pro-Europe and anti-liberal. By adopting a 
comprehensive analysis of the multi-organizational field of protest composed by the left No 
camp, we have shown that: 
 
• Europe-building crystallized the oppositions of a large portion of the activists who were 
close to the alterglobalist movement. They were fighting for ‘another Europe’ in the same 
way they were fighting for ‘another world’. From this perspective, European institutions 
constituted an ‘identity marker’, to use the Agrikoliansky’s term (2007). It is reasonable 
to think that these trends will continue in the future and will probably change European 
dynamics. 
• However, the referendum period was also an opportunity for many activists to participate 
in the building (even if imaginary) of this ‘other Europe’. By forcing collective actors to 
provide concrete content of what this other Europe meant, a central division appeared 
among those who defended the French model of the state and those who worked toward 
unifying the battles beyond national borders to promote a ‘European’ social justice.  
 
This analysis challenges the structural explanation that relies solely on French electoral divisions 
to explain the result of the referendum. We have seen that some French No voters were not 
simply ‘closed’ to Europe. By using social movement tools for the understanding of conventional 
politics like the referendum, we have been able to stress the crucial role of social movement 
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actors in French and European political life. 
 
Since the Second World War and the Europe-building process, European citizens have debated 
the idea of Europe. As Bartolini shows, the primary opposition to European integration was 
territorial (Bartolini, 2001: 25). With time, it tended to become a specific field of political action, 
with some social actors protesting against European institutions and other actors demanding that 
European institutions intervene as legitimate public authorities in an attempt to exert a direct 
influence on the European political process. Today, the debate among political and social actors 
appears to be less about the relevance of Europe-building and more about the nature of the 
building process and what form Europe should take (Balme et al., 2002: 23). During the 
campaign, Europe was at the heart of a strong public debate in France. On the left of the political 
spectrum, the dimensions of this debate are complex, mixing anti-liberal positions (the sole 
common elements of all actors against the Treaty), the defence of the national state versus the 
promotion of European solidarities, and political outcomes versus alternative process building. 
The specific articulation of these dimensions by collective actors will facilitate or constrain the 
possibility of the building of other multiorganizational fields in the future, in France and beyond 
national borders. 
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Table 1 – The two referendum camps 
Yes camp No camp 
UMP PC 
 PS, with dissidents FN 
Les Verts, with dissidents CGT, unofficially 
CFDT, unofficially USS 
MEDEF  ATTAC / CEDETIM / 
Copernic Foundation 
 
Confédération paysanne 
 
NB: In bold print, the organizations (or fractions thereof) that are part of the Collectif pour le 
NON au Traité. 
 
Notes 
                                                
i ‘Do you agree with the Act of Parliament authorizing the ratification of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’, my translation. 
ii During the winter of 2003, Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s government reformed pension plans. The 
pension reform was quickly linked to Europe-building, and Brussels asked the French 
government for a financial ‘clean-up’ plan (Le Monde, 25 April 2003). On April 23, the main 
unions (CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC, UNSA and FSU) agreed to create a common front against the 
reform. In May 2003, huge union demonstrations were organized against the proposed pension 
and educational reforms. After the Raffarin government proposed a series of amendments to the 
proposed law, the CFDT accepted the agreements and broke rank with the united front. Despite a 
large mobilization in June, the law was adopted in the National Assembly. It is during this event 
that the link between European directives and the national government’s acquiescence was 
publicized by opponents to the reform. 
iii This gave rise to the Collectif d’initiative national pour un rassemblement antilibéral de 
gauche et des candidatures communes (National Initiative Collective for a Left Anti-Liberal 
Movement and Common Candidates), which was working nationally as well as locally to 
nominate a single left Parti socialiste candidate for the 2007 presidential election. 
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iv The PS was at that time organised internally along four main ‘streams’: 1) Nouveau Monde, 
headed by Mélenchon and Emmanuelli;  2) The Nouveau Parti socialiste, headed by 
Montebourg, 3) Motion militante, headed by Dollé, 4) the majoritarian stream, headed by 
François Hollande, FirstSecretary of the Party. After the referendum, divisions within the party 
remained, even after the National Congress in November 2005. 
v The alterglobalization movement is a ‘global social justice movement’ or a ‘movement for an 
alternative globalization’. In this article, it refers to the diverse networks that emerged against 
globalization in France and elsewhere in Europe at the end of the 1990s and that developed 
during the World and European Social Forums. 
vi In December 2004, ATTAC organized an internal consultation: 84% of the members who voted 
said that they would vote against the Treaty, and 72% said they wished that ATTAC would tell 
its members which way to vote. As a result, ATTAC directed all of its resources toward the 
campaign for an ‘authentically European ‘No’ ’ (Crettiez & Sommier, 2006: 489). 
vii In addition to these positions, we also see the more classic internationalist discourse, led by 
parties of the extreme-left, such as the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire. 
